There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets: there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous. Also, despite the large number of firms in the market, prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter. In a non-cooperative oligopoly pricing model, I show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures. Complexity preserves market power and corporate profits by bounding the financial literacy of consumers. As consumers find it more difficult to find the best deal, more of them optimally choose to remain uninformed about industry prices, which ultimately leads to price dispersion and failure of competition. Professional advice (i.e. an advice channel) removes this advantage, unless the firms increase aggregate complexity, decrease price dispersion across the industry, or institute incentive contracts with the advice channel.
Introduction
Price formation in retail financial markets deviates from the predictions of standard price theory in several important ways. The law of one price is violated: significant price dispersion is present when goods and services are homogeneous. Despite the large number of firms in each market, prices do not converge to marginal cost. Even when new firms enter the industry, prices often do not decrease and may in fact rise. These pricing irregularities have been documented empirically in the markets for credit cards (Ausubel 1991) , conventional fixed-rate mortgages (Baye and Morgan 2001) , S&P Index funds (Hortacsu and Syverson 2004) , life annuities (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown 1999) , and term life insurance (Brown and Goolsbee 2002) .
What is responsible for this seeming departure from classic microeconomics? The answer that I explore builds on the fifty year-old observation by Scitovsky (1950) that ignorance is a source of oligopoly power. Producers of retail financial products create ignorance by making their prices more complex, thereby gaining market power and the ability to preserve industry profits. 1 Many of the households who purchase retail financial products do not understand clearly what they are buying and how much they are paying for these goods. 2 The complexity that firms add directly affects consumer literacy about prices and can generate the irregularities noted above. 3 In this paper, I consider the following important questions: Given the "bounded" financial literacy of households, how do firms compete on price and optimally add complexity to their price structures? How does complexity affect price formation? What is the effect of firm entry on complexity and pricing? Do professional financial advisors (i.e., an advice channel) alleviate complexity or make things more complicated? What are the policy implications of this analysis? 4 1 While this strategy remains relatively unexplored in financial markets, it has been documented in other industries (Ellison and Ellison 2004) .
2 There is now a large empirical literature which documents this fact. Evidence from the mutual fund industry includes Capon, Fitzsimons, and Prince 1996; Sirri and Tufano 1998; Alexander, Jones, and Nigro 1998; Jain and Wu 2000; Barber, Odean, and Zheng 2003; Jones and Smythe 2003; Wilcox 2003, and Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2006. Evidence from the 401k and retirement investment literature includes Agnew and Szykman 2004 , Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2004 , 2005 , 2005a , 2005b and Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2006) . Evidence from the marketing literature includes Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 1998; Iyegar and Lepper 2000; Chernev 2003 and Gourville and Soman 2005. 3 Admittedly, complexity may not be solely responsible for the pricing artifacts in each of these markets. Other frictions induced by differentiation and switching costs may also play a role (Calem and Mester 1995) . However, differentiation and switching costs do not completely account for the failure of competition in these markets (Hortacsu and Syverson 2004) . According to Ausubel (1991) , there are not enough dimensions on which to differentiate credit cards to account for the absence of perfect competition with 4,000 lenders. 4 The importance of these issues was outlined in the 2006 Presidential Address to the American Finance Association I address these questions using a three-stage pricing complexity game in which homogeneous firms produce an identical financial product and compete on price for market share. In the first period, firms simultaneously choose their prices (mutual fund fees, interest rates, etc.) and the complexity of their price structures. That is, they decide how much to partition their prices into direct and indirect fees, whether to hide some charges in the fine print, or whether to generate new classes of fees not used by other firms. In the second period, consumers with heterogeneous search costs choose whether to gain perfect information about the price structure in the industry or whether to remain uninformed. The search costs in this model could represent the price of financial education or the time it takes to evaluate each firm's price structure. Those who pay this cost are called the informed and those who do not are the uninformed. The decision to become informed is endogenous in the model and is affected by both the prices and complexity in the market. In the third period, informed consumers purchase from the low-priced firm, whereas uninformed consumers choose randomly from all of the firms.
In equilibrium, price dispersion arises because the firms compete strategically for market share from both types of consumers. The firm with the actual low-price captures the entire share of the informed. All of the firms, however, receive some demand from the uninformed. The firms never charge marginal cost because they gain positive expected profits from sales to uninformed consumers. Also, it is impossible to have a "one-price" equilibrium in which all firms charge the same prices for their products. If they did so, one firm could undercut their competitors by a small amount and gain the market share from the informed consumers. So, equilibrium prices are strictly higher than marginal cost and there is always dispersion in prices.
The aggregate complexity of the industry is determined through strategic interaction between the firms. In equilibrium, the firms choose complexity as a monotonic function of the price that they charge. The low-price firms choose a complexity level that is lower than that for high-price firms.
Since the low-price firms want consumers to know that they have the cheapest prices, they want the industry to be as clear as possible. Industry clarity allows them to "undercut" their rivals and gain market share. In contrast, high-price firms desire more complexity. The more "difficult" the industry, the more uninformed consumers there will be and the more market share the high-price by John Campbell (Campbell 2006) . Given the size of retail markets, frictions imposed by firms in the market have significant economic impact. In 2005, $2.8 trillion of home mortgages were initiated (Freddie Mac, June 2006 Economic Outlook) . Also, 53.7 million American households owned mutual fund shares, accounting for over $8 trillion in funds (Investment Company Institute 2005) .
firms will receive. Industry confusion is the way high-price firms gain market share.
After deriving the equilibrium of the game, I consider several implications of the model. I first evaluate the effect of entry of new firms on the distribution of prices and complexity. I find that increased competition always leads to higher industry complexity. When more firms compete for market share, the probability that they receive demand from the informed consumers decreases. To maximize expected profits, the firms tend to increase complexity in order to optimize the revenues they receive from uninformed consumers. Increased complexity and higher cognitive load makes it harder for consumers to become informed. If a larger fraction of consumers remain uninformed when more firms are present, then prices rise. Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) have previously shown that entry into the S&P index fund industry in 1996-1999 was associated with a rightward shift in the distribution of prices.
The second major implication that I consider is the effect of an advice channel. In the mutual fund industry, the advice channel is a system of brokers who offer investment advice to household investors. In the credit card, life insurance, and mortgage industries, price search engines assume the role of advisor. Search engines "advise" consumers about the range of prices (interest rates and fees) available in the industry and detect the low-price product. To study the pricing effects induced by an advisor, I extend the original three-stage model to a four-stage model. The firms establish the industry as before, but in the second stage, the industry experts (those with negligible search costs) form an advice channel and market their information services to consumers. They charge consumers an advisory fee and incur an education cost of providing this service. In the third stage, consumers decide whether to pay their own search costs, pay for advice from the channel, or remain uninformed. In the fourth stage, consumers make their purchases based on the information that they have.
In this version of the model, if the education costs to provide information are less than the benefits to gaining information, perfect competition arises because the advice channel markets their services to consumers with high search costs. All consumers become informed and price dispersion disappears. According to the model, the firms can prevent this outcome in three ways:
they can increase the complexity in the industry (driving up the costs of educating consumers), they can decrease the price dispersion in the market (lowering the benefit of perfect information), or they can sign contracts with the advice channel that align incentives to preserve industry profits.
All three of these strategies have been documented empirically (Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Ellison and Ellison 2004) , though they remain relatively unexplored in financial markets.
Finally, I consider the policy implications of the analysis. The oligopoly power induced by complexity may be limited in three general ways. First, if the firms were forced to disclose prices clearly, the industry would be more competitive. Requiring firms to disclose prices, but not restricting the form in which these disclosures are made, will not improve consumer surplus. The second way to increase consumer surplus is to restrict the types of contracts that firms may have with the advice channel. By limiting the incentives that firms may offer the advice channel, this would remove an important mechanism whereby the firms can protect industry profits. Finally, increasing financial literacy by making financial education more efficient (lowering the cost of education in the model)
should also push the industry toward clarity and lower prices.
The model in this paper has several empirical implications. Since complexity is an important source of value for firms, changes in complexity should be positively correlated with firm prof- Dell shares fell 3 percent on the Nasdaq Stock Market."
This quote suggests that as prices become less opaque, producer surplus decreases leading to a lower stock valuation. It also suggests that financial firms are aware that complexity may be used as a strategic tool when they price their own products.
The model also predicts that as competitive pressures rise in an industry, firms will respond by adding more complexity to their prices. This implies that as firms enter the market and industry concentration falls, the complexity should increase. 5 The model also suggests that the presence of an advice channel should cause industry complexity to rise and price dispersion to fall. Note that 5 One way to test this prediction would be a time-series that correlates industry concentration (i.e., HerfindahlHirschman index) to the level of price complexity present in public disclosures (i.e., mutual fund prospectus or a credit card disclosure).
this does not imply that prices will fall, rather they should be more concentrated when an advisor is present.
Besides modeling pricing behavior in retail financial markets, another contribution of this paper is to extend the literature on oligopoly pricing with consumer search. 6 Many existing models address pricing strategies, but do not provide insight into the role of information in these markets. Prices are dispersed in equilibrium, but firms are unable to affect the search efficiency of their consumers. 7
It seems natural to examine all of the strategic alternatives that are available to firms, that is to model how firms "hide" information about prices when consumers search. The "hide and seek" pricing game that I model is new to this literature, providing insight into the role of information in achieving industry price dispersion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I set up and solve the three-stage pricing complexity game. I characterize the strategic behavior of the firms and prove existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the game. In Section 3, I analyze the effect of entry on industry prices and complexity. In Section 4, I analyze the four-stage game with an advice channel.
In Section 5, I discuss the policy implications of the paper. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains all of the proofs.
Strategic Pricing and Complexity

The Market
Consider an economy in which n firms, indexed by j ∈ N = {1, ..., n}, produce a homogeneous retail financial product. The product may be used by households to finance the purchase of consumption goods (for example, a credit card) or as an investment vehicle to maximize lifetime utility (for example, an index fund). The firms face zero marginal costs and have no capacity constraints.
None of the firms have an informational or skill advantage compared to the others. They have 6 This literature includes Diamond 1971; Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Weitzman 1979; Stiglitz 1979; Reinganum 1979; Braverman 1980; Varian 1980; Braverman and Dixit 1981; Salop and Stiglitz 1982; Burdett and Judd 1983; Carlson and McAfee 1983; Rob 1985; Perloff and Salop 1985; Stiglitz 1987; Stahl 1989; Robert and Stahl 1993; Stahl 1996; Anderson and de Palma 2003; Gabaix, Laibson, and Li 2005; Spiegler 2005. 7 One exception is the model by Robert and Stahl (1993) . In their model, firms choose prices and whether to advertise (inform) their price to a proportion of consumers, given that consumers undertake sequential search. In this paper, I consider the flip-side of the problem. That is, I evaluate the extent to which consumers are uninformed in the first place.
equal access to consumer marketing data. In the case of providing investment services, they make identical portfolio decisions based on market conditions and achieve the same expected return and return variance. The only difference between the firms is the price that they charge and the complexity that they add to their price structures. 8
In the market, there is a unit mass of consumers M who each have unit demand for the retail good. Every consumer i is risk-neutral and maximizes the expected payoff from their purchase.
Their utility is given by
where v is the fundamental value of the product, p i is the price that they pay, c i is the cost of learning about prices, and δ i ∈ {0, 1} represents consumer i's binary decision whether to become informed.
The value v is commonly known among the consumers and can be considered the monopoly price for the good. Because consumers receive v when they purchase the good from any firm, maximizing utility in this market is equivalent to minimizing the sum of price and effort (search costs).
A consumer who chooses to learn about industry prices through costly search (c i ) will purchase the good at the lowest price available, p min = min j {p j } n j=1 . Alternatively, if they remain uninformed, they purchase the good randomly from the firms with probability 1 n , resulting in an expected price p = 1 n n j=1 p j . The decision to become informed is an "all or nothing" choice, that is, consumers may either become fully informed or may remain completely uninformed. For technical simplicity, I do not include other adaptive decision-making procedures (i.e., rules of thumb or heuristics) that would allow consumers to narrow the field of choices and make a partially-informed decision. 9 The model could be generalized to include such intermediate levels of knowledge, at the expense of clarity.
All or nothing search has been used previously by Stiglitz (1977) and Braverman (1980) . 10 Searching in this fashion is costly when prices are complex. If it is difficult for consumers to find the important price components (hidden fees and add-ons) and computation is necessary, 8 Restricting the firms to produce an undifferentiated good is not for technical convenience. Rather, if complexity in fee structures causes failure of competition and price dispersion in the market, adding heterogeneity in the product attributes will only make price dispersion more likely.
9 Making choices randomly ( 1 n ) is the most severe form of adaptive decision making. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) refer to this type of consumer as a "step 0" type. For a review of adaptive decision-making, see Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1993) . 10 Shugan (1980) describes all or nothing search as a "lowest-price tournament" in which n − 1 sequential price comparisons are required to determine an overall winner. For a full review of search technology, see Stahl (1989 t=3 Consumers make purchase Figure 1 : Pricing Complexity Game. At t = 1, n financial services firms establish the industry structure. They each choose prices p j for their products and the complexity k j of their prices. At t = 2, consumers calculate the expected benefit B of perfect information. They choose whether to pay a cost c i to fully observe prices as long as c i ≤ B. Otherwise, if they remain uninformed, they purchase their products from the firms randomly. Finally, at t = 3, informed consumers pay p min = min j {p j } n j=1 and uninformed consumers pay an expected price p = 1 n n j=1 p j .
it takes more effort to compare prices and find the cheapest price. Also, every firm's complexity choice affects the cost of the entire analysis because it is mandatory to compare every firm's price to all of the others.
The pricing complexity game is a three-stage game (Figure 1 ), which proceeds as follows. In the first period (t = 1), the firms simultaneously set prices for the product and decide how complicated to make their price structure. That is, each firm chooses
where p j is the actual (total) price that firm j charges and k j is a measure of how difficult it is to sift through the price on all dimensions.
to be the strategy space for firm j and σ j ∈ Σ j to be firm j's (mixed) strategy over prices and complexity. In any Nash equilibrium, the strategies of the firms are given by the vector σ * = [σ * 1 , . . . , σ * n ]. Once the first period is over, consumers decide whether to become informed about pricing in the industry. For simplicity, I assume at this point that consumers are endowed with specific statistics about industry prices before making search decisions. Explicitly, they observe the mean p and minimum p min prices in the industry, but they do not know which firm offered the actual low price. This simplification seems compelling because in reality consumers often know important statistics about industry prices, but do not know where to get the best deal. Also, this assumption is consistent with traditional models in the search literature. For example, in Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , consumers are given a vector of prices − → p and a vector of locations − → l , but they do not know which location offers which price. 12
Before choosing whether to become informed, consumers also observe the aggregate industry complexity, which I denote by K. However, they do not observe the vector of complexity choices
without spending effort analyzing all of the price structures in the industry. In this model, complexity is considered to be an "experience" good since consumers do not know how complicated the process is for each firm until they commit c i to analyze prices. K is a multivariate
That is, as any one firm makes their price more difficult to evaluate, it makes the whole industry more costly to analyze. A high level of K means that the price structure in the industry as a whole is cumbersome and opaque, whereas a low level of K means that the industry price structure is lucid. I define K min = K(k, . . . , k) as the lower bound on K.
At t = 2, investors are allowed to pay a personal cost c i to gain perfect information about which firm has the lowest price. The cost c i could represent the price of financial education or the time it takes to evaluate every firm's price structure. These search costs are distributed in the consumer
The distribution function G(·) can be considered a gauge of the population's cognitive ability to analyze a financial product. For example, if
holds for all c, then population 1 is more financially literate than population 2. The key is that the distribution of search costs drives the population's ability to make informed purchasing decisions.
I do make the weak assumption that G(0|K) > 0, so that there will always be a small group of industry "professionals" who have negligible search costs. So, no matter how complicated the industry is, there will always be some informed consumers. 13
The distribution of search costs also depends on the level of industry complexity K. For two 12 According to Salop and Stiglitz (1977) , they "move only one step away from perfect information" in order to analyze how consumers search for the best alternative.
13 The mass point in the distribution at c = 0 can be made arbitrarily small, making the assumption as weak as one wants. However, having at least an atom at c = 0 implies that there will always be some consumers who are informed. In Section 4, these are the consumers who can form an advice channel in the industry.
for all c. Increasing the aggregate complexity (K) raises the costs that consumers need to pay to become informed. This is an important channel in which the firms' strategic interaction affects the consumer types that they face in the market.
Consumers will rationally pay c i as long as it is less than the expected benefit to clearly observing the prices from all n firms. I denote this benefit by B, which is simply
If the consumer remains uninformed and chooses randomly from the n firms, the expected price that they will pay is p. If they become informed, they will purchase the product from the low-price firm and pay p min . For a given B, G(B|K) is the fraction of the consumer population that observes prices perfectly.
In the third stage of the model, consumers make their purchases. The firm with the low price receives demand from the entire mass of informed consumers as well as their share ( 
Firm Behavior
In this section, I consider the firms' problem of creating an industry price structure. I pose the optimization problem faced by the firms and prove general existence of a Nash equilibrium for the game. I show that the equilibrium involves a positive price mark-up over marginal cost and that a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies cannot exist. That is, there will always be price dispersion in this industry. In order to study the effect of certain market conditions on the distribution of industry prices, I derive a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for the game.
Define J * to be the set of firms who quote the lowest price. Let n j * be the number of firms in J * , so that the n j * firms in J * split the demand from the informed consumers equally. Each firm j chooses p j and k j to maximize its expected profit, that is, they solve
where the expected demand Q j is calculated as
Q j is composed of two parts. The first expression represents the demand from the fraction G(B|K)
of informed consumers. Firm j receives 1 n j * of this demand if they are one of the n j * firms that quote the lowest price in the industry. The second expression represents the expected demand from
The following proposition establishes the general existence of a Nash equilibrium in this pricing game and characterizes some of its properties. 4. When n = 2, no asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists.
According to Proposition 1, prices are always above marginal cost (Property 1). Consider, without loss of generality, firm 1's payoff in the game and suppose that all other firms choose p −1 = 0. If p 1 = 0, then the benefit to becoming informed is B = 0 and the expected profit is π 1 (0) = 0. For any p 1 > 0, the expected benefit is positive (B = p 1 n ), so that as long as B < c, there will be a positive measure of uninformed consumers that will purchase randomly from all of the firms. Therefore, if firm 1 chooses p 1 ∈ (0, nc), π 1 (p 1 ) > 0, which rules out a Bertrand equilibrium. 14 It follows that if the upper bound on search costs c is greater than the value of the financial product v, then there will always be uninformed consumers in the market. In this case, setting p = 0 is a strictly dominated strategy.
Proposition 1 also implies that a one-price equilibrium is impossible (Property 2). This means that, in equilibrium, there will be positive price dispersion between the firms in the industry.
Consider, again without loss of generality, that all firms except firm 1 choose a pure pricing strategy
Since for ǫ > 0,
then firm 1 has an incentive to undercut its competitors. The last inequality results from the fact that G(·|K) is continuous and there is a market share (mass of informed consumers) that firm 1 no longer has to share. In the same way, it follows that two or more firms cannot have the lowest price in the industry in a pure strategy equilibrium (Property 3). If that were so, a profitable epsilon deviation would be available that would break the tie. Therefore, we know that there is always a non-degenerate distribution of prices in the market.
Price dispersion will arise if the firms play a mixed strategy in equilibrium or if an asymmetric equilibrium in pure strategies exists. By Property 4, this latter case is impossible with only two firms (and may be for n ≥ 3, but this remains unknown). In order to evaluate how the distribution of prices changes in response to other market conditions (in particular the effect of entry and the presence of an advice channel), it is useful to analyze the strategies that firms will choose in a mixed strategy equilibrium. I now derive a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for the game. 15 14 In the model, the lower limit for kj is k. If k > 0, then there will always exist some complexity in each price structure. Proposition 1 also holds when k = 0. In this case, the if all firms choose p = 0 and k = 0, there is a profitable deviation for firm 1 to choose p1 > 0 and k1 > 0 so that K > 0 and E[π1] > 0. A proof ruling out a "double Bertrand" equilibrium is straightforward to construct.
15 This type of mixed-strategy is present in other models of competitive pricing with consumer search (Varian 1980; Rosenthal 1980; Stahl 1989; Robert and Stahl 1993; Stahl 1996) .
Define Π j p j , k j |σ −j as the expected profit for firm j when it chooses p j and k j , given the symmetric mixed strategies of the other firms σ −j . From firm j's point of view, the prices of the other firms are random variables ( p 1 , .. p j−1 , p j+1 , ... p n ), which implies that G(B|K) is a random variable. So, when firm j computes their optimal mixing function and expected profit, they must consider the conditional expectation of the fraction of informed consumers, given the mixing distributions of the other firms. As such, let us define Γ(p j , k j , σ −j ) to be the conditional expectation of G(B|K) given a choice of k j and p j for firm j and the strategies of the other firms. That is,
Therefore, each firm maximizes their expected profit, which is expressed as
The following proposition establishes the existence of a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium and characterizes the strategic choices of the firms.
Proposition 2. (Symmetric Mixed Strategy Equilibrium) In the pricing complexity game, there exists a symmetric equilibrium σ * = {F * (p), k * (p)} in which firms randomize over prices in [p, v] according to F * (p) and choose complexity as a deterministic function of p according to k * (p). The lower bound p is computed as
where
The function F * (p) solves
According to Proposition 2, the firms randomize over prices p ∈ [p, v] according to a distribution function F * (p) and choose k j using a pure strategy given their draw from F * (p). It is not optimal for any firm j to mix over the entire strategy space Σ j , that is, k * (·) is a deterministic function of p. The firms choose k j in a binary fashion according to the p that they draw from F * (p). 17 Highpriced draws (above a threshold levelp) will choose maximal complexity and low-priced draws will choose minimal complexity. This means that if a firm has a low price, they want consumers to be informed about it. The low-price firms will choose k so that their contribution to the aggregate complexity K is minimized. In this case, they desire the fraction of informed consumers G(B|K) to be the highest it can be. In contrast, if a firm has a high price (abovep), they want consumers to be poorly informed. The high-price firms will choose k to maximize their contribution to K in order to minimize G(B|K).
is monotonically decreasing in both Γ H and Γ L . That is, as the expected fraction of informed consumers increases, the lower bound on the support of their mixing distribution decreases. As Γ H and Γ L approach one, p → 0 and as Γ H and Γ L approach zero, p → v. This means that if consumers are less literate about financial decisions, the bound on the lowest price possible rises.
As the fraction of uninformed consumers reaches its upper limit, prices will approach the monopoly price. The relationship between p and n, however, is more complicated and is addressed in Section 3.
17 Since the equilibrium distribution F * (p) is strictly increasing and continuous, the event that a consumer draws p =p from F * (p) is of measure zero. Therefore, I do not consider this outcome in the analysis.
The expression in (2) is implicit in F (p), since both Γ H and Γ depend on F (p). It is not possible to express the general solution to (2) 
The Effect of Entry on Industry Complexity and Prices
When the number of firms in the industry increases, how does the distribution of prices change?
What effect does entry have on complexity (K)? In what follows, I show that as more firms compete in the industry, the probability that each firm adds complexity rises, which leads to higher aggregate complexity. This occurs because the firms use complexity as a way to preserve oligopoly power. Interestingly, as the level of complexity rises, the prices in the industry may rise as well.
This is counter-intuitive as classic theory tells us that more competition leads to lower prices and convergence to marginal cost. In contrast, this model predicts that the use of complexity may cause failure of price competition and rising prices following entry. 18
Proposition 2 shows that some firms will choose a baseline level of complexity (k) and some will choose to add more complexity than is required (k). The probability of choosing k j = k for each firm is
The subscript n is added to indicate that F n (p) depends on the number of firms, not a partial derivative with respect to n. Since the right-hand side of (4) is increasing in n, each firm's probability of choosing high complexity is monotonically increasing in n.
To evaluate the effect of n on the expected amount of industry complexity E[K], it is helpful to define the function K(m) as the increase in aggregate complexity over K min when m firms choose k and the rest choose k. Clearly, if all firms choose low complexity, K = K min and K(0) = 0.
18 Rosenthal (1980) and Stiglitz (1987) also find rising prices with increased industry competition.
Also, since
dm > 0. Given this, the expected aggregate complexity may be computed as K min plus the expectation of a binomial distribution
The following proposition characterizes the effect of entry on industry complexity.
Proposition 3. (The Effect of Entry) In the pricing complexity game, the probability that a firm chooses high complexity (k) is monotonically increasing in n. In the limit as n → ∞, all firms choose k. The expected aggregate industry complexity E[K] is increasing in n.
Proposition 3 implies that firms will use complexity as a way to protect market power and oligopoly profits as the number of competitors increases. This is because their chances of winning the business of the informed consumers decreases as the number of competing firms increases. By adding more complexity, each firm increases the fraction of consumers who are uninformed, which increases their profits in the case that they do not win demand from the informed consumers.
To see how n affects the expected aggregate industry complexity E[K], consider the following example. Suppose that the aggregate complexity is the average of the choices of all n firms, that
The expected aggregate complexity is calculated as
Since the second term is an expectation of a binomial distribution with probability
It is straightforward to show that
> 0, that is, entry leads to higher expected industry complexity.
To gain some intuition about how the added industry complexity affects the distribution of for all p, which means that the distribution of prices with a higher bound on complexity first-order stochastically dominates that with a lower bound. A similar plot may be generated by allowing k to vary as well. For higher levels of k, the distribution of prices also shifts to the right. Clearly, in this example if a policy-maker was able to bound α, then prices would become more favorable to consumers. I explore these policy implications in Section 5. Now, let us consider an example in which we fix the bounds on complexity and evaluate the distribution of prices when n varies. Consider the plots in Figure 3 . Using the same algorithm Figure 3 : The distribution of prices as a function of the number of firms in the industry. In the first panel, plots are given for n = 4, n = 8, and n = 12. As n increases for small n, more weight is placed in the tails of the distribution. However,as n increases for large n, F n+1 (p) stochastically dominates F n (p). This is observed in the second panel where plots are given for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 100. The other parameters are v = 1, k = as in Figure 2 , the left-hand panel plots F n (p) for n = 4, n = 8, and n = 12, and the right-hand panel plots F n (p) for n = 10, n = 50, and n = 100. The other parameters are K = 1 n j∈N k j , v = 1, k = 3 4 , and k = 1 4 . When n is low, entry induces the firms to add more density to the tails of the distribution. As competition grows initially, firms add density to the low prices to increase their chances of winning market share from the informed consumers. However, because competition lowers their overall chances of winning, they also add density to the higher prices to gain more surplus from the uninformed consumers when they lose. Therefore, price dispersion is higher on average as n grows initially from four firms.
Once n becomes large, the probability that each firm receives demand from the informed consumers becomes very small compared to the gain in surplus (from raising prices) available from the uninformed consumers. Therefore, once n becomes large the effect of entry is for the distribution of prices to shift to the right. That is, firms will transfer more density to the right tail of the distribution. This trend is evident in the right-hand panel and was documented in the S&P index fund industry in 1996-1999 by Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) .
The preceding example shows that entry may not only lead to higher complexity, but also to higher prices. It would also be nice to know conditions under which we are guaranteed that F n+1 (p) first-order stochastically dominates F n (p). For stochastic dominance to occur with entry, it is necessary that p n+1 ≥ p n and sufficient that Γ n+1 ≤ Γ n . If both of these conditions are present, then prices will increase as more firms enter the market. Two factors may cause Γ n to decrease: cognitive overload and rising complexity. Increased cognitive load is captured in this model by comparing the underlying distribution of search costs when n + 1 and n firms are present. If G n+1 (c|·) ≤ G n (c|·) for all c, then some consumers will reach cognitive overload when considering an extra option in the market and fewer will choose to become informed. Likewise, if the underlying distribution changes such that G(B|K n+1 ) ≤ G(B|K n ), then rising complexity will lead to Γ n+1 ≤ Γ n . Both of these effects may coincide simultaneously.
It is impossible, though, to prove a stronger stochastic dominance result based on the primitives in the model because the expected benefit to information with n firms B n is not monotonic in F n (p).
That is, F n+1 (p) < F n (p) does not imply that B n+1 > B n . If F n+1 (p) < F n (p), then the mean rises with n (p n+1 > p n ) and so does the expected minimum price (E n+1 [p min ] > E n [p min ]). However, F n+1 (p) < F n (p) does not imply any monotonic relationship between the differences between these two statistics.
4
The Effect of an Advice Channel
In Section 2, I consider a model in which firms directly market their goods and services to consumers. In this section, I determine how prices and complexity change when advisors can help consumers select which financial instruments to purchase. I show that if the advice channel markets their expertise to consumers, they target consumers with high search costs, which causes all consumers to become informed. In this case, price dispersion disappears and the market is perfectly competitive. However, the firms may prevent this outcome in three ways: they can raise industry complexity, decrease the benefit to becoming informed, or offer the advice channel incentives to share in industry profits. Rising industry complexity causes the cost of education to rise, making it less profitable for the advice channel to market its information services. Decreasing the expected benefit of information involves making industry prices more concentrated (decreasing price dispersion). Concentration in prices is not equivalent to decreasing prices, however, as it is possible for prices to rise, while still preventing the advice channel from enforcing competition. Signing incentive contracts makes it more profitable for the advice channel to hold back information from consumers and preserve industry profits.
In the mutual fund industry, the advice channel is a system of brokers who have expertise about the industry, but do not manage portfolios or trade directly. They offer advice and sell information to investors. They distribute investment vehicles for the funds and resell investment products. In the United States, the advice channel accounts for 55% of the assets under management in the industry and 37% of households purchase mutual fund shares through the advice channel. Only 10% of mutual fund sales occur via a direct sale between mutual fund companies and individual investors (Table 1 ).
In the mortgage, life insurance, and credit card industries, price search engines play the role of advisor. Websites established by intermediaries allow consumers to search for the best rates. Even though there is no "human" interaction at the website, the consumer depends on the search engine in the same way that they depend on a financial advisor. Therefore, in the following analysis I treat the objective functions (and resultant behavior) of the search engine and the financial advisor as isomorphic.
Consider the four-period extension of the pricing complexity game in Figure 4 . In the first stage, the firms choose p j and k j as in Section 2. In the second stage, market participants who have negligible search costs (the "professionals") form an advice channel and sell their information to fellow consumers for a price w. 20 The professionals pay an advisory cost A(K) to educate each 20 I assume that the advice channel has monopoly power so that they earn positive profits from selling their information to consumers. Monopoly power may arise if the advisor is a sole entity or if multiple advisors implicitly collude over time to avoid the Bertrand paradox and maintain monopoly levels of w (Abreu 1988) . If the advice channel is competitive, then the results from the extended game are identical to those in Section 2. t=1 Firms choose prices p j and complexity k j t=2 Advice channel sells its information for w t=3 Consumers pay c i , w, or remain uninformed t=4 Consumers make purchase decision Figure 4 : Pricing Complexity Game with an Advice Channel. At t = 1, the firms choose p j and k j . At t = 2, the advice channel offers retail information services to the consumers at price w. At t = 3, consumers choose whether to pay a cost c i to fully observe prices, pay w for advice, or choose randomly from the firms. At t = 4, consumers purchase, given the information they possess.
consumer that they serve. This cost could be interpreted as the time-cost to educate others or the cost of developing learning materials. I assume that A(K min ) = 0 and that A(·) is non-decreasing in K. In the third stage, consumers decide whether to pay a personal cost c i , pay the price w for advice, or remain uninformed. In the last period, consumers make their purchase decisions based on what they know.
As in Section 2, we can start in period three and work backwards. At t = 3, consumers calculate the expected benefit of perfect information B and then decide whether to pay for perfect information. When w > B, no consumer pays the advice channel for information and the advice channel makes zero profits. If c i ≤ w ≤ B, then consumer i becomes informed independent of the advice channel. If w ≤ c i and w ≤ B, then they rely on the advice channel to become informed. So, as long as w ≤ B, then 1 − G(w|K) of the consumers will purchase services from the advice channel and G(w|K) will pay their own personal costs c i to gain perfect information.
In period two the advice channel solves
If A(K) < B, it is profitable for the advice channel to offer information services. In this case, since the objective function is continuous and the action space [A(K), B] is compact, there exists a w * that maximizes the profits. All consumers become informed and firms with higher prices receive zero demand. As long as A(K) < B , it is a weakly dominant strategy for all firms to charge marginal cost. Price dispersion disappears and the market is perfectly competitive.
If A(K) > B, then price dispersion and industry profits persists because it is no longer profitable for the advice channel to provide information services. There are two potential ways in which the industry may achieve A(K) > B and prevent perfect competition. First, in aggregate the industry complexity K can increase so that the cost of educating consumers becomes exceedingly high.
Second, the level of price dispersion may decrease, thereby lowering B, given a particular level of
A(K).
It is important to note that a decrease in price dispersion is not equivalent to a drop in prices. In fact, it is possible for prices to rise but become more concentrated (lowering B), which would preserve industry profits and avoid erosion due to the presence of an advice channel.
Both of these strategies have been documented empirically, though they remain relatively unexplored in financial markets. Ellison and Ellison (2004) show that firms in the market for computer memory and central processing units (CPU's) increase complexity when there are price search engines in the market. By increasing K, the firms in this market add search frictions, which makes it harder for the search engine to assist consumers search (rising A(K)). The second way to preserve profits (changing B) has been studied in the market for life insurance. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) show that price search engines cause price dispersion to decrease and prices to drop by 8 − 15%.
It is important to note, however, that price dispersion in this market did not disappear altogether and that it is still not perfectly competitive.
To derive a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for the extended game, define
The function Ψ(p j , k j , σ −j ) is the conditional probability that the costs of educating consumers exceeds the benefits of perfect information, given firm j's choices of p j and k j , and given the symmetric mixed strategies of the other firms. 21 Because the firms cannot coordinate when they choose their prices and complexity, it is possible ex post that A(K) < B. In this case, the low-price firm gets all of the industry demand. If in fact A(K) > B, then all firms receive positive profits because some consumers remain uninformed. Therefore, each firm maximizes the expected profit
The following proposition establishes a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the extended game 21 Again, for ease of notation, I will denote Ψ(pj, kj , σ−j) as Ψ, unless it is necessary to specify its arguments.
and characterizes the strategic choices of the firms. 
The lower bound p A is computed as
and the other parameters are
, and
The structure of the equilibrium in Proposition 4 is similar to that when an advice channel is not present (Proposition 2). The expression in (6) is implicit in F A (p) since both Ψ and Γ depend on F A (p). As in Section 2, it is impossible to write the general solution for F * A (p) explicitly, but a solution is guaranteed by Schauder's fixed point theorem. Note that the function in (6) and the lower bound in (7) embed the result in Proposition 2. If Ψ = 1, we get the same implicit function of F (p) and lower bound p as in (1) and (2).
To gain some intuition about how education costs affect prices, consider two cost functions A 1 (·) and A 2 (·), such that
The probability that price dispersion and industry profitability persists ex post increases when the cost of education rises. According to (7), the lower bound of the support p A is monotonically
. In this case, the distribution of industry prices is always non-degenerate. In contrast, as A(K) → 0, then p A → 0 and F * A (p) → 1, which means that as the costs of providing information to uninformed consumers approaches zero, the industry becomes competitive and prices converge to marginal cost.
The binary complexity decision rule in Proposition 4 is identical to that in Proposition 2 and the cutoff price is the same (p A =p). This implies that the expected level of industry complexity E [K] does not change when an advisor is present and an increase in A(K) does not occur in equilibrium on average. The firms only use the strategy of lowering B to protect industry profits. Because complexity is costless, this is a suboptimal outcome for the firms and likely arises because of the non-cooperative nature of the game. If the firms could coordinate their choices, increasing aggregate complexity would indeed be an optimal strategy.
There are other ways in which the firms in the industry may preserve price dispersion and oligopoly profits. One way is for the firms to align themselves with the advice channel and sign incentive contracts that are mutually profitable. With these types of incentives, advisors may find that their commission payments from the industry exceed the profits that they can generate from selling information to consumers. In this case, they will no longer provide complete information to consumers. Also in this case, as we shall see, if the marginal costs to providing education are sufficiently high, then the firms will also optimally add more complexity to the industry. By contracting with the advisors, the firms are able to coordinate their complexity choices and increase the aggregate complexity when it is advantageous to do so.
Incentive agreements are quite common in retail markets. In the mutual fund industry, frontend and back-end load fees are paid to the advice channel when shares in funds are purchased.
Commissions are usually paid as a percentage of the assets invested. Mutual funds also pay the advice channel incentives in the form of marketing dollar funds to reimburse the channel for pushing their funds. In the mortgage, life insurance, and credit card industries, payments to the search engine occur in the form of sales commissions. These commissions may be a flat "referral fee" or may be a percentage of the sale. The details of the agreement are contractually set before the retail products are made available for sale though the channel.
To model this, consider the extended game again with one change. At t = 1, the firms not only choose p j and k j , but also make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (contract) to the advice channel to share in the expected industry profits. The contract space that I consider allows the firms in aggregate to pay the advice channel a monetary transfer T = π * A to resell their products, where
In doing so, the channel now has an incentive not to disclose private information about the industry price structure. I assume for technical convenience that each firm pays an equal share of this transfer.
Admittedly, this contract space is narrow, since the ex post transfer must make the advice channel at least as well-off as if they sold their information to consumers. The firms offer a statedependent contract that pays the advice channel a monetary transfer based on the independent draws that each firm receives from F * (p). 22 In this way, I avoid any coordination problems in which the firms ex post do not satisfy the advice channel's incentive compatibility constraint
To derive a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium when incentive contracts are allowed, define
The function Ω(p j , k j , σ −j ) is the conditional expectation of the transfer required to meet the advice channel's incentive compatibility constraint, given firm j's choices of p j and k j , and given the symmetric mixed strategies of the other firms. 24 The hazard rate function λ G is the instantaneous decrease in the fraction of consumers who become informed independent of the advice channel,
given the fraction of consumers who depend on the advice channel for information. As such, λ G is a measure of the sensitivity of the marginal consumer to higher complexity. It always holds that
Making the channel's incentive compatibility constraint bind, the firms in the industry now maximize the expected profit
The next proposition establishes a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium when contracting between 22 Another approach, which would be more consistent with classic contract theory, would be to allow the firms to offer the advice channel a fraction γ of their profits. However, this type of model is analytically intractable and loses much of the economic intuition that the monetary transfer model allows. Focusing on a narrow contract space also allows me to avoid problems like coordination and free-riding, in order to capture the effect of the surplus transfer on the complexity and pricing in the industry.
23 For technical simplicity, I do not consider contracts in which the firms offer the advice channel less than π * A in exchange for revealing only partial information about the industry.
24 Again, for ease of notation, I will denote Ω(pj , kj , σ−j) as Ω, unless it is necessary to specify its arguments.
the firms and the advice channel is possible. 
The lower bound p AC is computed as
and
Suppose that A(K) = A, a constant. Then, there exists an equilibrium of the same form, except that
The equilibrium in Proposition 5 shares the same structure as is Propositions 2 and 4. The distribution of prices is non-degenerate and perfect competition does not arise because the firms and advice channel share the common goal to preserve industry profits.
Adding complexity to the industry has two effects. It increases the revenue that the advice channel receives when they market their information to consumers. It also increases the education costs incurred when they provide these services. Both of these income effects change the monetary transfer that is required to satisfy the advisor's incentive compatibility constraint. As long as
, increases in complexity cause education costs to rise faster than the revenue that is generated from information services. In this case, the firms will add high complexity to their pricing schedules with higher probability. A sufficient condition which ensures this is
for all k ∈ [k, k]. That is, if the marginal cost of educating consumers is sufficiently high, then firms will have an incentive to increase complexity in the industry. The density F AC (p AC ) is less than the density F (p) derived in Proposition 2, and the expected industry complexity E[K] rises.
If the firms cannot affect the cost of education (A(K) is constant), then they will choose high complexity with lower probability. That is, 1 − F AC (p AC ) < 1 − F (p). This occurs because high complexity increases the profits to the advice channel when they market their information services, which increases the monetary transfer needed to meet the advisor's incentive compatibility constraint. When higher complexity does not make education more expensive, it destroys value for the firms because they need to provide higher incentives to the advice channel.
In Proposition 5, since p AC and F * AC are not monotonic in the primitive parameters of the model, it is not possible to predict whether prices will increase or decrease when contracts are present. However, it is clear (also from Proposition 4) that the actions of an advice channel affect complexity and prices in the market and may preserve producer surplus. From a social welfare standpoint, these relationships have important welfare implications, which are analyzed next.
Policy Considerations
In this section, I consider the welfare effects of the pricing strategies outlined in the paper. I start by considering the effects of complexity on consumer and producer surplus. Then, I propose some of the policies that might provide relief to consumers.
Welfare Analysis
Without an advice channel present, consumer surplus (CS) is computed for the unit mass of financial consumers as the aggregate value of the retail financial product (V ) minus the price paid minus the sum of search costs. So, CS is calculated as
The second and third terms in (13) aggregate the expected revenue that is collected from consumers and the last term is the aggregate search cost spent by consumers to learn about industry prices.
In the absence of an advice channel, total welfare in the market is the sum of producer and consumer surplus
Since the marginal cost of production is zero, producer surplus is given by
Therefore, the welfare loss in the market due to complexity is given by
By inspection, the welfare loss is non-monotonic in K. That is, with K = 0, no search costs are paid because the industry is perfectly clear and prices converge to marginal cost. Everyone is informed in this case, so perfect competition arises. When K is maximized, the fraction of informed consumers is minimized. In this case, as fewer consumers pay search costs, the welfare loss due to complexity decreases. If K rises high enough such that the fraction of uninformed consumers approaches one, the welfare loss to search converges to zero. Therefore, from a social planner's standpoint, the absence of complexity or an infinite amount of complexity both achieve social efficiency. However, with zero complexity, consumers maximize their surplus because perfect competition arises and with infinite complexity, producers maximize their surplus because prices approach monopoly levels.
In the presence of an advice channel and no contract with the firms, W reaches first-best when the cost of education is negligible, that is, when A(K) = 0. In this case, there is no price dispersion, consumers do not pay search costs, and CS = V . When contracts are possible and education is costly, however, consumer welfare decreases because price dispersion persists, inducing some consumers to pay search costs. Therefore, the contracts that firms sign with the advice channel and the cost of education have significant effects on consumer welfare.
Restoring Consumer Surplus
The model in this paper is a partial equilibrium analysis. What is left out is that consumers and producers use their rents to fund their lifetime consumption. If aggregate surplus decreases because of strategic complexity, this has general effects on the economy. In what follows, I focus on policies to restore consumer surplus.
What should be evident is that there are three policies that can maximize both consumer surplus and overall welfare. First, the government could limit the complexity of the industry. Since ∆W = 0 when K = 0, limiting complexity would drive down welfare losses. The policy implication is that requiring disclosure is not enough. To limit welfare losses, the government needs to require clear disclosure. The second way to affect welfare is to limit contracting between producers and the advice channel. Doing so limits search costs and maximizes both total welfare and consumer surplus. As already noted, perfect competition may arise in the absence of contracts. Finally, the third way to restore consumer surplus is for the government to make education more efficient. This may require making financial education mandatory in school systems or designing a mechanism (for example, a web tool) for consumers to better learn about the industry. Lowering the marginal cost of educating consumers would help limit complexity and would make the industry more competitive.
Conclusion
Purchasing a retail financial product requires effort. Because prices in the market are complex, consumers must pay a cost (time or money) to compare prices in the market. Some consumers gain sufficient expertise and get the best deal. Those with high search costs forego value, and often make purchases without knowing exactly what they are getting or how much they are paying. In fact, they may also be unaware that they are indeed over-paying.
In this paper, I develop a model of pricing complexity in which firms compete on price for market share and strategically add complexity to preserve market power in the face of competitive pressures. The resulting equilibrium matches empirical observation: price dispersion persists even when goods are homogeneous, prices do not converge to marginal cost despite a large number of firms, and entry of firms into the industry may cause prices to rise.
The analysis in the paper has important social implications, given the large size of retail financial markets. I outline three policies that could restore consumer surplus. First, clear disclosure of prices would limit complexity and loss of consumer surplus. Second, limiting the incentive contracts between firms and financial advisors would make the industry more competitive. Finally, improving the delivery of financial education and increasing financial literacy would restore surplus to households who purchase retail products.
There are several possible extensions to this paper, which are the subjects of future research.
First, the model assumes that consumers have unit demand for the retail product and all participate in the market. One extension would be to include a more sophisticated demand function, in which some consumers might not participate if complexity were too high. In such a model, firms would have to make a trade-off between adding complexity and losing consumers to non-participation.
The welfare losses might be higher if participation in the market is sufficiently low.
A second extension would be to consider the multi-market effect of complexity. Consumers are endowed with limited resources to devote to all of their financial decisions. They cannot become experts in all markets and may choose to become differentially knowledgable about the various markets in which they participate. Complexity in one market may make it more difficult to become informed in other markets. This externality may lead to higher general complexity across the economy and an over-emphasis on financial innovation. Importantly, it is possible that such an externality might cause a state of "consumer apathy" to develop. In this case, consumers would lose maximal surplus because they become overloaded with information that they are unable to distill. One possible result is that they make purchases randomly across all financial markets.
A third extension would evaluate a more competitive advice channel. In the paper, I assume that the advice channel has monopoly power. This could be relaxed to allow for an analysis of how bargaining power between the parties affects equilibrium complexity. If heterogeneity were added between advisors, it would be interesting to evaluate what would happen if consumers had varied abilities to choose their advisor.
In the paper, I assume that the good that is produced is homogeneous, so that if price dispersion occurs in this case, then it would be even more likely to occur when products are heterogeneous.
Another extension might include differentiated goods where the value v is also a strategic variable chosen by the firms. In such a model, consumers would have random utility over both the value and the price of the good. This type of analysis may predict what type of products will be present in the market, given the consumer literacy present.
The model that I present in this paper is a one-shot game. Consumers do not learn over time and cannot switch products once they realize what they have purchased. Another extension of this model would be to embed the pricing complexity game in a dynamic game in which consumers could observe at a later date (at a cost) the price that they are paying for their goods after they make their purchase. At this later time, they would have the choice to either stay with this good or purchase the good from another firm. This type of model would allow for an analysis of switching costs in the industry and for evaluating how literacy and complexity evolve over time.
Finally, the last extension would be to apply the analysis in this paper to security design in general. At some level, even institutional investors have limits to their expertise and struggle to value certain aspects of securities, such as embedded options, collars, or default protection. It is possible for experts to construct securities with sufficient complexity to gain an advantage because buyers of the product may not have sufficient expertise to properly value the security. This type of strategic complexity in security design is implied in Harris and Piwowar (2006) .
I believe that this paper presents a plausible argument for considering complexity as an important determinant of price formation in retail financial markets. Given the large number of potential extensions of this analysis, this paper hopefully represents a first step toward greater understanding of the effect of complexity on security design, asset prices, and market structure.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Derivation of k * (p): The expected profit to firm j, given that all of the other firms use the strategy {F (p), k(p)}, is
First order conditions with respect to k j and symmetry (k j = k) imply that Existence of F * (p): Since in any mixed strategy equilibrium, each firm must be indifferent between choosing any p ∈ [p, v], it must be that Π(p j , k j |σ −j ) = π, a constant, for all p. We can use (A1)
to write
Solving for p yields (1). Since Π(p j , k j |σ −j ) = π for all p ∈ [p, v], we can write (A1) as
Solving for F (p) and dropping subscripts yields
, then
Equation A3 T has a fixed point in F C .
Proof. Define X = C( [p, v] , R) as the space of continuous functions mapping [p, v] into R. X is a Banach space under the norm ||F || 0 = sup p∈ [p,v] |F (p)| (Davis (1966) , Theorem 2.2, page 43).
Define F C ⊆ F C to be the space of continuous functions that map [p, v] into [0, 1] such that ∀F ∈ F C , |F ′ | < M for some M > 0.
F C is compact and convex, which I prove as follows. For any ǫ > 0, define δ = ǫ M . For all F ∈ F C and for any two points p, q ∈ [p, v] such that |p − q| < δ,
Therefore, F C is equicontinuous. Since, ||F || 0 ≤ 1, F C is bounded. By the Arzela-Ascoli Theorem, F C is compact.
Next, consider two functions F, G ∈ F C . For any α ∈ [0, 1], define
Without loss of generality consider that α < 1 2 . Since F and G are continuous, for every ǫ > 0, there exists a δ F > 0 and a δ G > 0 such that for all p 1 , p 2 ∈ [p, v] ||p 2 − p 1 || < δ F ⇒ ||F (p 2 ) − F (p 1 )|| < αǫ. and ||p 2 − p 1 || < δ G ⇒ ||G(p 2 ) − G(p 1 )|| < αǫ.
Therefore, H is continuous.
Since the first derivative of F and G is bounded, α|F ′ | < αM and (1 − α)|G ′ | < (1 − α)M , which implies that |H ′ | < M . Finally, since R(F ) ∈ [0, 1] and R(G) ∈ [0, 1], then R(H) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, H ∈ F C . Hence, F C is convex.
Since the functions B and G(·|K) are continuous, Γ and Γ H are continuous in F (p). Thus, the operator (T F )(p) is continuous. Since the operator T maps F C → F C , by Schauder's fixed point theorem T has a fixed point in F C (Istratescu (1981) , Theorem 5.1.3). Therefore, T has a fixed point in F C .
Hence, a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium {F * , k * } exists.
in (6), a fixed point exists. The lower bound in (7) follows in the same fashion as in the proof of 
Taking the derivative of (A9) with respect to k j yields
The derivative ∂π * A ∂k j is guaranteed to be negative as long as
Suppose that (A10) holds for all k ∈ [k, k]. Then, ∂Ω ∂k j < 0. We can write the expected profit for firm j as
Differentiating (A11) with respect to k j and symmetry (k j = k) yields
This leads to the binary strategy for k * AC (p) in (10). Since The expression in (9) follows from algebraic manipulation in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2. A solution to (9) follows from Schauder's fixed point theorem: using the compactness and convexity of the functional space established in Lemma A.1 and the continuity of the operator in (9), a fixed point exists. The lower bound in (11) follows in the same fashion as in the proof of Proposition 2.
